Digital Commons & digital sovereignty

I’ve been poked with the below questions regarding digital sovereignty, a topic which (finally) emerges for the widest audience. As some questions go pretty deep, I thought they’d be an interesting base for discussion for people like us, who develop a community around open source system software, so I post them here. Your comments & opinions would be useful, I suspect. So here it goes:

Q1. What is your definition of digital sovereignty? (For an individual, an organization, a nation?)

Q2. How would you assess the current situation of digital sovereignty in your country, or respectively for Europe?

Q3. What do you consider critical software infrastructures? (in particular: key software associated with a substantial ecosystem of developers and users :wink:

Q4. How would you define some digital commons?

Q5. What link(s) do you see between critical software infrastructure and these digital commons?

Q6. Should critical software infrastructures necessarily be open source?

Q7. What software infrastructures/digital commons you see as essential at European level? I guess there are (a) those that exist and that need to be maintained/reinforced, (b) those that should be developed to “catch-up”, (c) those we anticipate will emerge soon, (d) those we should “master” but the situation is hopeless.

Q8. Concerning the above, what concrete/credible actions could/should be undertaken/launched in 2022 in your country or at EU level, from your point of view?

Q9. Which type of coalitions of actors should carry these actions in your opinion?

I’ll give it a shot…

Q1: The ability to control all means necessary to participate in digital communication. Control here means choice in the products (both physical and software), and the possibility (both legally, technically and practically) to create own replacements for any component, or have them created.

Usually, the presence of Free Software implementations is an indication that digital sovereignty is possible with a given technology. That the increased complexity of the web means that of all common technologies one of the most open is down to effectively two products and a horrendous effort to replace or have replaced them (making it impractical). Absence of a Free Software implementation does not indicate lack of digital sovereignty (there can just be too small a market); the impossibility to create one does.

Q2: Largely OK in Austria; communication happens via web and EMail, with open document standards used. The migration from Bürgerkarte (of which there were Free Software implementations) to a yet unspecified system, leaving only the centralized Handysignatur that hinges on the cellular network, makes the future situation uncertain.

Q3: Software on its own is never critical, it becomes critical when used as an exclusive means to provide a critical application. Software is made critical by lack of digital sovereignty, by not exercising it, or by the application being implemented without consideration for software failure. Some software is currently hard to avoid (in what is often a mixture of failure of markets and failure of operators to make a critical service usable without singular dependencies on software); Linux and the web browsers are examples of these.

In a relaxed definition, this can include software that is widely used, is not easy to replace on the time scales it might need replacing, or particularly exposed. This relaxation would extend the list to practically every widely deployed piece of software (glibc, apache, nginx, ffmpeg etc).

Q4: As digital network services are always limited to some extent by an actual peer, I prefer to describe data as digital commons rather than data providers. That puts the text of Wikipedia in that category, as well as the archives of Free Software distributions, but not the providers (wikipedia.org or the Debian project) in that category, as they only facilitate access to to the underlying commons on a best effort basis. An exception to this are the underlying services that truly are decentralized: the Internet, DNS and the various swarms of peer to peer networks built on the Internet.

Q5: They are only linked weekly; projects may critically depend on software to maintain commons, but the commons themselves can be replicated without critical dependencies.

Q6: Public (as in publicly funded) services that invest in software should do that in a way that the maximizes the public benefit of their investment, which is usually the case when having their customizations made Free Software rather than adjustments to proprietary software.

Critical public infrastructure should preferably be built without dependencies on single critical pieces of software, Free or nonfree.

Q7: The above-mentioned. (None of this is Europe specific).

Q8: Identify components of critical infrastructure that have singular dependencies on software. Estimate the costs of securing them with a larger variety of software solutions vs. the cost of hardening the used software to the requirement levels of the application. My guess is that frequently the latter will win; the chosen software should then be declared critical for this application, and development contributed to.

Q9: Direct government attention can be detrimental to the population’s trust in the application, as evidenced by the decline in the acceptance of the Austrian Corona warning app that coincided with the former Interior Minister (known for his Bundestrojaner aspirations) brought up making use of the app mandatory. Using third parties, maybe similar to how research funding is handled, can ease that concern. In coordination with developers, and based on the criticality descriptions provided by the use in critical infrastructures, these third parties should distribute as much money as the using services get allocated by the severity of their dependency.

Emmanuel Baccelli via RIOT notifications@riot-os.org wrote: > I’ve been poked with the below questions regarding digital sovereignty,

You don’t shy away from asking impossible questions :slight_smile:

> Q1. What is your definition of *digital sovereignty*? (For an
> individual, an organization, a nation?)

First, these three things are actually often mutually exclusive. They don’t necessarily have to be, but in the ~27 years since I participated in the S/MIME escrow/export/signature-only wars, we have yet to have significant deployment of encrypted email. OpenPGP is the only cross-enterprise use of secure email, and it didn’t distinguish well enough between signing and encrypting keys. SMIME is used, but only within enterprises or specific silos. Secure email is not digital sovereignty, but it’s a component of it which is perhaps oldest.

For an individual (particularly in a hostile nation or organization), relationships with BigTech are ironically, key. One needs to surrender to Apple and/or Google (via DoH, Android/iOS, HTTPS everywhere) in order to get help defending yourself against organizational and/or national on-path attackers (MITM).

For organizations, Google/Apple are the enemy, trying to smuggle devices into the company that the company does not control. For hostile nations, they are all enemies, and the organizations try to cooperate while never really cooperating.

My definition is digital sovereignty is that I control which software runs on all of my devices, and that I can verify that my devices are running unmolested software. That doesn’t necessarily mean that I can write and run my own software on an arbitrary device (but it could include that).
This isn’t about jailbreaking iPhones: this is about deciding if I want to run the latest from Apple, last year’s OS, or something else from another party. (True: in Apple only Apple decides. Android has had choices.)

The choice isn’t between run ChromeOS or Windows11 on a PC, or be insecure. That’s not the choice. It’s that I can install whatever I like on a PC, and then known that it hasn’t been corrupted by an organization, nation, or another induhvidual.

> Q2. How would you assess the current situation of *digital sovereignty*
> in your country, or respectively for Europe?

zero. negative even, because they think they have, but don’t. Countries and governments think they are sovereign, but really it’s microsoft, apple, google, and whomever last did maintenance on your building elevator. US Patriot act can compel any US company to supply a trojan to any third party. (Exactly what the FBI wanted Apple to do, but they aren’t allowed to trojan US citizens… only foreigners)

> Q3. What do you consider *critical software infrastructures*?  (in
> particular: key software associated with a substantial ecosystem of
> developers and users ;)

left-pad, and now Log4j. Everything else is irrelevant :slight_smile: I wouldn’t say, “key software associated with a substantial ecosystem of developers and users”

I’d say, instead, “key software required in order to create a patch for a critical (physical) infrastructure that keeps people alive”

I’d like to say that it’s the contents of Ubuntu Core 20 (or equivalent), along with the ARM cross-compilers, git. But, I suspect that that’s not what’s used to patch pipelines. Instead, it’s a Windows XP or 7 desktop with a copy of the IAR IDE that was current in 2008. Because, if they were using gcc with a CI system, then: a) they wouldn’t have lost the ability to build new versions b) they would have been building and shipping new versions regularly, and there wouldn’t be any critical issues.

Makefile+cc is now more than 40 years old. If you started doing pipeline control systems in 1980 using an AT&T 3B1 as your build platform, odds are it just still runs.

> Q4. How would you define some *digital commons*?

A set of things and/or places which is not constrained by a zero-sum game, and which all individuals can capture at least as much benefit as they contribute, if not more.

Bandwidth is not usually considered a digital commons: if I use too much, then it often prevents others from using any. UNLESS economies of scale mean that when I use more, I pay more, and that means that we can purchase more, and the relationship is non-linear, so that a doubling of expenses might result in a 10x increase in available bandwidth.

Open source projects are mostly digital commons: I can use all I want of a project (contributing my needs), and it mostly does not result in anyone else being excluded. Where it breaks down is if there are drive-by contributions that are expensive to test or maintain.

> Q5. What link(s) do you see between critical software infrastructure
> and these digital commons?

Not enough links!

OpenSSL (Heartbleed), Log4J, etc. shows us how digital commons are exploited by those charged with maintaining critical infrastructure, and who never contribute back.

> Q6. Should critical software infrastructures necessarily be *open
> source*?

Open Source is a meaningless term which has been abused to cover anything someone from marketing wants it to mean. If you are asking about a specific license, then we could have a discussion. For many Internet based systems, GPL3 is not a problem, since they never ship binaries. AFFERO bothers people, and I know a few PHP geeks who never did understand open source, and who have written PHP equivalents of left-pad, and who think they ought to be able to retire based upon that. At the same time, there is very little support for doing maintenance on open source systems that are in common use. In Canada, I’ve been able to leverage the SRED credits to some extent to do some of this work. The Europe NGI.EU and RIPE grants ought to be used more.

> Q7. What software infrastructures/digital commons you see as essential
> at European level? I guess there are (a) those that exist and that need
> to be maintained/reinforced, (b) those that should be developed to
> "catch-up", (c) those we anticipate will emerge soon, (d) those we
> should "master" but the situation is hopeless.

Not being a European (stupid BREXIT)… (YET?!)… I think that Europeans have done a good job at learning to cooperate with each other (I speak as an outsider looking in, and I acknowledge that it doesn’t always look the same from the inside). That’s something Canada and the US do not know how to do. US states do not cooperate at all except by federal mandate.

I think that the opportunities for growth markets for IoT and digital services are: a) full product lifecycle handling b) intelligent transportation systems c) cross-jurisdictional mini-payments (think transit) and micro-payments (using a public toilet, leaving a tip, splitting a bill)

A colleague in Ottawa tried to start a company like Tile Tracker (before them), which would be used to let you locate your kid’s missing mitten. (He was too soon, and Tile, at $15 each, are 100x too expensive) There are immense privacy issues involved, but imagine never losing stuff again, and not having to replace missing stuff, and the impact to landfills by returning, refurbishing, etc. stuff.

> Q8. Concerning the above, what concrete/credible actions could/should
> be undertaken/launched in 2022 in your country or at EU level, from
> your point of view?

> Q9. Which type of coalitions of actors should carry these actions in
> your opinion?

I don’t know.

1 Like

chrysn via RIOT notifications@riot-os.org wrote: > Q3: Software on its own is never critical, it becomes critical when

Agreed!

> used as an exclusive means to provide a critical application. Software
> is made critical by lack of digital sovereignty, by not exercising it,
> or by the application being implemented without consideration for
> software failure.  Some software is currently hard to avoid (in what is
> often a mixture of failure of markets and failure of operators to make
> a critical service usable without singular dependencies on software);
> Linux and the web browsers are examples of these.

> In a relaxed definition, this can include software that is widely used,
> is not easy to replace on the time scales it might need replacing, or
> particularly exposed. This relaxation would extend the list to
> practically every widely deployed piece of software (glibc, apache,
> nginx, ffmpeg etc).

I think that it is instructive to consider that 15-20 years ago everything was “best viewed in IE5 at 1024x768”, and now, thanks to Google (Android, ChromeOS), and Apple, that this is almost entirely gone outside of internal Enterprise stuff.

There’s an important lesson here, but it’s hard to exactly figure out what is core, and what was just one monster (Apple/Google) battling another (MS). Que: https://www.imdb.com/title/tt5034838/ Godzilla vs Kong.

> Q6: Public (as in publicly funded) services that invest in software
> should do that in a way that the maximizes the public benefit of their
> investment, which is usually the case when having their customizations
> made Free Software rather than adjustments to proprietary software.

Agreed. In Canada, it was estimated that gc.ca spends $1B/year internally customizing proprietary systems. That doesn’t include buying systems! An effort 10 years ago (that I was peripherally involved with) attempted to quantize the how much was spent on buying systems, and mostly failed, because the asset databases were unclear. When they buy a name brand system and it comes with a Windows7 license, and they immediately wipe that and put a site licensed WindowsXP golden image on it, how do you account?

BTW: What’s the latest on desktop OSs at City of Munich?

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